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I.

Introduction

It is difficult to argue that any given person goes more than a day without exploiting the
advancements of computer software technology. Whether it is from the newest release of
the video game Call of Duty or the innovative “Snap” feature in Windows 7, people benefit
daily from the progression of software innovation. Software is generally defined as a
collection of written programs and procedures, usually referred to as code, that instruct a
computer what to do. With household computer and internet access up to 68 percent in
2009 and computer software engineer employment expected to increase by 32 percent in
the next 10 years, it is also difficult to ignore the growing importance of the software
industry in the nation’s economy1 (Computer Use and Ownership) (Computer Software
Engineers ). It is for this reason, economists have been investigating the economics of the
software industry and the role of intellectual property rights in the high rate of
technological growth.
Of particular interest to many researchers is the notion of the open source software
communities and their ability, and willingness, to stimulate innovation without taking
advantage of traditional copyrights or patents. Open source communities consist of
developers, sometimes at several different locations or organizations, sharing program
code and making it freely accessible to copy, study, refine and modify (Lerner & Jean,
2002).Conversely, proprietary software is exclusively the property of its developers and
1

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the expected growth of employment in software engineering is much

faster than the average of all other occupations. Already holding approximately 1.3 million jobs in 2008, computer
software programmers and engineers are expected to see more than 300,000 new jobs created in the next 10
years.
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copyrighted or patented against exploitation and duplication. Open source software
development has obvious cost-saving traits; stemming from high knowledge diffusion, code
reuse, and lowered transaction costs, that proprietary firms cannot replicate but could
potentially benefit from.
While proprietary firms and open source communities exhibit many differences,
their existence in the computer software industry causes them to both experience a unique
industry trait; a high knowledge-based market. The software industry is characterized by
network externalities and first-mover advantages that cause innovation to be the key to a
firm’s success. As a result of these characteristics, new proprietary firms, motivated by the
promise of high profits, can only enter and survive in the market with innovative products.
Logically, two questions arise from the notion of open source: Why would developers
chose to participate in programming without the incentives of proprietary code or the
ability to gain profit from its sale? Secondly, if open source software programmers have
strong enough motivations to innovate without profit compensation and do it at lower
costs than proprietary firms, what is the need for patents or copyrights? Economists have
found the motivations of open source software, or OSS, developers of particular interest
and have conducted several studies on the topic.2 Generally, findings show that a large
motivation of OSS programmers is the ability to clearly signal their skills to potential
employers through the visibility of open source code. By and large, these employers are
proprietary firms, who can afford to hire these programmers due to the profits gained from
securing forms of protection of intellectual property rights and then selling software.
2

Details and findings of these studies will be discussed later in the paper during the literature review .
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Copyrights and patents allow proprietary firms to invest in research and development
without having to worry about the public good characteristics of computer software
leading to free riders undermining their profits. Public goods are goods that exhibit
nondiminishability and nonexcludability allowing free riders take advantage of these
properties by reaping the benefits of one firm’s innovations without experiencing any
costs. (Riddell, Shackelford, Schneider, & Stamos, 2009).3
Subsequently, even though OSS communities innovate at lower costs, they rely heavily
on potential job opportunity motivations from proprietary firms who, in turn, are
dependent on copyrights. While copyrights overcome the public good nature of computer
software, it also leads to preventable higher fixed costs. I will illustrate that open source
software firms help reduce these costs, but would struggle to exist and succeed without the
incentives provided from the proprietary industry. By lowering costs, profits for
proprietary firms increase which stimulates entry and innovation in the software market.
Therefore, a mixed market is favorable due to the interdependence and symbiotic
relationship of the two markets inducing lower costs that allow the computer software
industry to maintain a high level of technological growth.
The paper’s discussion is structured as follows. In Section II I will review relevant
literature and note important observations and/or findings. The literature review will also
offer a closer look into open source communities by assessing information previous

3

Nondiminishability refers to the property that one person’s consumption does not restrict the amount of any

other persons. Nonexcludability refers to the property where “nonpayers” cannot be excluded from using the
good.
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researchers have acquired on OSS motivations, operations, and cost-saving behaviors. In
Section III I will investigate the market failure issues behind the unique characteristics of
the software industry and conceptualize the problem diagrammatically. Next, in Section IV
I will introduce and examine the symbiotic relationship between open source communities
and the resulting profits that lead to a higher level of innovation. Lastly, in Section V I will
address limitations of the paper and, finally, I will discuss policy implications in Section VI
and Section VII I will conclude.

II.

Literature Review

It is important to acknowledge the relationship between the direction of this paper and
studies in earlier literature to understand how this research is relevant to current research
in the economics of computer science and to demonstrate how this particular argument
offers a new analysis. The relevant literature is separated into two general topics; (i)
Motivations behind Open Source Communities and (ii) Benefits derived from OSS. Some
literature falls into more than once category.

(i)

Motivations behind Open Source Communities

The development of open source communities astonished and intrigued economists
from the very beginning. It is imperative to understand the underlining incentives for open
source developers’ since their motivations are arguably the one of the causes for open
source communities’ dependence on proprietary firms. Frestchman and Gandal (2007)
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investigate this “economic paradox” with an empirical study and survey of open source
developers. They find that output per contributor in OSS projects is higher with less
restrictive licenses, implying that the programmers have signaling and status incentives for
participating in OSS projects.
Similarly, Lerner and Jean (2002) suggest that even though the “media like(s) to portray
the open source community as wanting to help mankind, as it makes a good story” , an
explanation based on altruism can only go so far (Lerner & Jean, 2002, p. 2). As a result,
they explore the incentives behind OSS and report that there are two distinct motivations;
career concerns and ego gratification. “Career concerns” reflects the notion of potential job
opportunities resulting from the developer being able to signal his/her skills by being
named directly as a contributor to a highly visible piece of programming. Hiring companies
are able to evaluate a programmer’s skills, creativity and initiative because the source code
is free to view. Lerner and Jean (2002) go on to explain that peer recognition is what spurs
an “ego gratification” incentive to participate in OSS projects; contributors are able to
signal to their ability to fellow peers.
Bizter and Schroder (2007) take this one step further, suggesting that the combination
of ego gratification and career concern signaling results in a motivation to produce higher
quality programming work than that of a proprietary firm. They also discuss the
motivation of the “nature of voluntarism”; explaining that people usually contribute to
projects they enjoy doing. This also relates to the argument of altruism as a potential
incentive to contributing to OSS development. Collectively, all of these findings offer insight
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into the OSS communities and their motivation from potential career opportunities that
proprietary firms offer.

(ii)

Benefits derived from OSS

Generally speaking, most of the literature regarding OSS benefits advocated that the
largest gain to be had from implementing open source software was associated with costsaving characteristics. By demonstrating that open source communities innovate at lower
costs, I can point that their existence reduces costs and subsequently increases profits in
the software industry.
Returning to Bitzer and Schroder’s research, they suggest that signaling motivation
behind open source contributors help lower development costs. This is accomplished by
generating higher quality work, due to career/ego concerns, which results in lower future
debugging costs and lessens the need for technical support.4 In their research Bitzer and
Schroder(2007) also coin the term “boundless cooperation”, referring to the idea that “
because commercial exploitation of newly developed software is not intended, there is no
need to keep new ideas secret and therefore barriers against cooperation do not arise”.
Boundless cooperation leads to lower costs by inducing high knowledge diffusion and
prompts combinations of complementary programming skills. The concept of boundless
cooperation in open source software also allows for basic code reuse. This idea supports
the argument of lowering innovation costs by lowering the time needed to code certain

4

Debugging refers to fixing “bugs”, or defects, in computer program code.

8

programs. This lessens a developer’s opportunity cost of writing the program, allowing
them to quickly move onto novel coding aspects.
Similar to Bitzer and Schroder’s analysis of OSS benefits, Lerner and Jean (2002)
discuss the advantages of lowering costs through cooperation. They discuss the idea of
forking, the “splitting of projects into competing developmental streams” and how while
forking can be beneficial, it is a delicate balance that sometimes turns into a destructive
process. This could happen if competing streams get into disputes about the project,
leading to the development of two entirely different programs created for the same
purpose, which is clearly a waste of resources. Lastly, Mendez-Duron and Garcia (2009)
use social capital, or knowledge flows, to show that investment in OSS communities and the
knowledge flows they cultivate results in higher returns.5 They also suggest that some of
these knowledge flows can support healthy forking within communities.
While most of the economic literature investigates OSS and the benefits that are derived
from its development, none demonstrate the goal of this paper to show how these benefits
can lead to maintaining a higher level of technological growth in a symbiotic mixed market.

III.

Knowledge Spillovers and Market Failure in Proprietary Software

With a knowledge intensive industry such as software engineering, the exchange of
ideas, or knowledge spillovers, are almost impossible to avoid and can cause serious
problems within a market. It is important to understand the difference between internal
5

Medez-Duron and Garcia define social capital as “ the actual potential resources embedded in relationships

amoung actors” or “knowledge flows”. They also define “returns” as the projects diffusion over the network .
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knowledge spillovers and external knowledge spillovers, for they have very different
economic implications. Internal knowledge spillovers are interparty exchanges of ideas
that can facilitate “creation of new related goods and new ways of producing existing
goods” (Carlino, 2001, p. 17). Not surprisingly, internal knowledge spillovers, or what
Mendez-Duron and Garcia(2009) called knowledge flows, are exactly what helps open
source software practice healthy forking strategies and experience high levels of
innovation. Additionally, the significance of these knowledge spillovers is what causes the
software industry to rely so heavily on innovation.
However, in opposition, external knowledge spillovers are exchanges of ideas between
two different, competing parties. External knowledge spillovers could allow outside
companies or firms to benefit from one firm’s innovations without incurring any of the
costs associated with research and development. This concept is referred to as a positive
externality and in section one of this paper this idea was discussed in relation to public
goods and free riders.6 Positive externalities tend to lead to an underallocation of
resources and result in less than the socially desirable amount of a good or, in the worst
cases, even no production (Riddell, Shackelford, Schneider, & Stamos, 2009). Copyrights
and patents allow innovators to internalize these positive externalities by restricting
outside parties use, visibility, or replication of a good. More specifically, firms can charge
for use of copyrighted or patented information and payments to the firm help them
internalize the external benefits.
6

A positive externality is formally defined as when benefits are reaped by a third party; one that is not directly

involved in the transaction.
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The concept of positive externalities in intellectual property rights can be applied
directly to the software industry. Despite the obvious social benefit, the computer software
industry experiences little or no demand from the consumers due to free riders taking
advantage of positive externalities. Without demand there is no profit, and without profit
there is no incentive for firms to produce, even though there is social benefit to be gained.
This can result in a social welfare loss; a market failure where it is possible to reallocate
resources to better the society. This market failure can be illustrated diagrammatically for
the proprietary software industry; however an understanding of software firm’s unique
marginal costs is needed first.
Marginal cost is defined as the change in total cost that results from a one-unit
change in output (Frank, 2008). In the case of software production, the duplication (or
creation of another unit of software) of a program is as simple as just writing another disk.7
The cost of this process is so small that it has virtually no effect on the total cost of
operation for a proprietary software firm. As a result of this, the marginal cost can be
thought to be essentially zero in the computer software industry. Given this information,
the proprietary software market – with no intellectual property rights – can be shown in
the following diagram:

7

This process is also referred to as burning to a CD.
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Proprietary Software No Copyrights/Patents
Price

SWL
SMB
PMC = SMC = 0

P*/Pe
Qe

Q*

Software (Q)

Figure 1

It can be seen in the diagram that market’s optimal equilibrium, where social marginal
benefit (SMB) intersects the social marginal cost curve (SMC), is at (Q*, P*). However, as
mentioned earlier, with no copyrights or patents to protect against free-riding there will be
no demand, resulting in no production. This causes the actual equilibrium (Qe,Pe) to be at
(0,0) where there is no production despite the products ability to provide social benefit.
Consequently, the market failure can be thought as the forgone benefit of not producing at
the optimal level of Q* and is depicted in the diagram as a social welfare loss (shaded
triangle).
In an attempt to internalize these benefits and eliminate a free-rider problem,
copyrights and patents were introduced to the computer software industry. By abolishing
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free-riders, copyrights and patents take away consumers ability to enjoy software products
without incurring costs. However, since there is still a benefit from the programs to be had,
consumers are forced to pay an amount, based on their willingness and ability, for the
software and therefore creating a demand in the market that is equal to the marginal social
benefit of the programs. Again, this can be depicted graphically:

Proprietary Software With Copyrights/Patents

Price

P 2*

CS

PS

SWL

SMB = D

PMC = SMC = 0

P*
Q2* MR

Q*

Software (Q)

Figure 2

In figure two, the traditional economic theory of monopoly power derived from
copyrights is assumed, resulting in the marginal revenue curve having twice the slope of
the demand curve.8 Under monopoly assumptions, the market determined equilibrium is

8

Marginal revenue is the amount of total revenue gained after a one unit increase in output (Frank, 2008).
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found at quantity Q2* and price P2*. It can be seen that the protection provided by
copyrights and patents allow for the market to experience a positive equilibrium and
capture both a consumer and producer surplus (CS and PS, respectively) as well as
ultimately allowing a firm to experience profits. Additionally, the diagram shows that
although there is still a social welfare loss associated with the monopoly power derived
from patent protection, the loss is significantly less than the industry without copyrights or
patents depicted in Figure 1.
While copyrights and patents help establish a better market for the computer software
industry, they also help stimulate innovation. Firms are unable to invest in research and
development if they do not have the funding from their profits and they do not experience
profit without copyright/patent protection. More specifically, Figure 2 illustrated the
creation of a producer surplus, also known to be equal to total fixed costs plus profit, after
the copyrights are introduced. With the profits being made, firms are enticed to enter the
market and due to the nature of the software industry, a firm can only enter this type of a
market with innovative products, thus the promise of high profits provides a large
incentive to innovate. Conclusively, it is shown that copyrights and patents induce profits
that enable firms to sustain the high level of innovation the industry demands.

IV.

Proprietary and Open Source : A Symbiotic Relationship

In order to examine the effect of OSS communities in the software market, the
relationship of open source and proprietary firms needs to be investigated. After reviewing
previous literature and research in the computer software industry, it became apparent
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that there existed an interdependent, complementary connection between the two types of
parties. The most applicable term for the relationship seemed to be symbiotic; defined as a
mutually beneficial relationship between different people or groups (Oxford Dictionaries).
In this specific case, it is evident that proprietary firms derive benefits from open source
communities while OSS developers simultaneously obtain benefits from those proprietary
firms. In this section of the paper both sides of this relationship will be investigated and
clarified to support the theory of a symbiotic relationship.
Initially, let us examine the prospect of open source developers, and their communities,
benefiting from proprietary firms. As introduced during the review of literature, it has been
reasoned that OSS contributors have two main motivations that overshadow altruistic
incentives; career concerns and ego gratification (Fershtman & Gandal, 2007). Both of
these incentives refer to the developer’s ability to signal his/her skills (to either a potential
employer or fellow peer) due to the extreme visibility of the software and the convention
which credits the authors by name. While this illustrates a definite reliance on proprietary
firms, it does not explicitly illustrate the benefits OSS communities are deriving from the
companies. In order to understand these benefits, the implications of potential job
opportunities motivating developers needs to be explored. Recall that earlier during the
discussion of OSS benefits, it was noted that career incentives motivate open source
developers to produce higher quality software. Furthermore, this superior quality of code
induces lower costs by lessening the need for technical support and debugging (Bitzer &
Schroder, 2007). It should also be noted that these lower costs may be experienced in the
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development of new and innovative software because higher quality code allows for a more
stable foundation for advancement. Lastly, it can now be recognized that this beneficial
cost reduction in innovation ultimately stems from the proprietary firms interaction with
open source communities because the firms are the subjects inducing cost-saving behavior.
Given that open source communities benefit from proprietary firms has been
established, the reverse can be considered. The most obvious potential gain proprietary
firms could obtain from open source developers is through their unpatented innovations.
Without any property rights preventing proprietary firms from exploiting the visibility and
availability of OSS code, they could utilize the information in beneficial way or even employ
it to spur their own innovation.
However, the specific licenses used by the OSS communities may dictate the extent to
which others, particularly proprietary firms, can benefit from the code by restricting
certain aspects or uses. There are two general types of open source licenses: permissive
and non-permissive. Non-permissive licenses, also referred to as copyleft or GNU licenses,
require that all derived works can only be distributed under the same license terms9. This
indicates that an open source software program must remain open source after
modifications or supplementations if it is being shared or sold. Conversely, permissive
licenses allow derived works to be redistributed on more restrictive license terms. For
example, an OSS program protected under a permissive license does not require derived
works to be open source code. (Lerner & Jean, 2002).

9

GNU is a General Public License used widely with the software industry.
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Nevertheless, proprietary firms can still benefit from OSS communities despite which
open source licenses they encounter. By either direct exploitation of the open source code
or by indirectly employing its concepts, proprietary developers can benefit from OSS
communities the same way open source contributors benefit from their own work. They
can experience lower costs by code reuse, favorable knowledge diffusion, and
combinations of complementary programming skills; all of which lower costs of innovation
and code development. Consequently, these observations support the idea that open
source communities and proprietary firms experience a symbiotic relationship.
After investigation of both sides of the relationship, it can be noted that almost all the
benefits resulting from the symbiotic bond between OSS and proprietary firms are actually
reductions in costs, particularly in the creation and innovation of new software. If we now
take the previous diagram for the software market into back into consideration, we can
capture the innovation implications of open source communities’ existence in the software
industry. Again, it was concluded that the symbiotic nature of proprietary and OSS caused
benefits in the form of lower costs.
Recall that with no marginal costs present for software firms, these lowered costs must
be experience in firms’ total fixed costs (TFC). Additionally, if these costs are only affecting
TFC, a curve that was not incorporated in either diagram, than the producer surplus
formed in Figure 2 is not changing with the introduction of OSS communities to the
software market. This indicates that the amount of producer surplus is not changing even
though total fixed costs are decreasing. For this to be possible, given that producer surplus
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is equal to TFC plus profit as established earlier, profits must be increasing. With profits
increasing, further entry into the market is experienced and with this entry comes even
more innovative products.
Ultimately, open source communities’ entrance into the market allows for proprietary
firms to enhance their profitability, thus increasing incentives to innovate within the
computer software industry. This analysis suggests that with a mixed market of both
proprietary firms and open source software communities, the computer software industry
can reach a higher level of technological growth by exploiting the lower costs derived from
a symbiotic relationship.

V.

Limitations

As with all research, there are some small limitations that accompany the theories and
that sometimes condition relevant findings. In this paper’s case, the foremost limitation is
the narrowed focus on a very simplistic, pure mixed market of only two types of firms
within the computer software industry; proprietary and OSS communities. Other research
has been conducted on the distinction between open source communities and open source
firms; the key difference stemming from the pursuit of profit by OSS firms (Linus
Dahlander, 2005). However, this paper only analyzes the relationship of OSS communities
and proprietary firms in the research and development market.
Similar to the narrowed focus of just one branch of open source population, this paper
also only investigated one type of proprietary firm; the firms that do not exercise any of its
own open source initiatives. Some companies have recognized the symbiotic relationship
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between OSS and proprietary and have established their own affiliated open source
communities or sectors within their firm10 (Campbell-Kelly & Swartz, 2010). Dahlander
and Magnussion (2005) go into investigate the managerial requirements that make it
possible to cultivate a symbiotic relationship, rather than commenalistic or parasitic, in this
type of situation.
While both of these factors are limitations, they still provide insight into the validity of
argument presented in the paper. It is argued that a mixed market provides a higher,
socially desirable level of technological growth in the form of more effective software. In an
industry characterized by network externalities and first-mover advantages, innovation is
key to a firm’s success. It is apparent that companies and communities have realized the
advantages of a mixed market and have begun trying to cultivate these benefits through
mixed firms to achieve higher levels of innovation.

VI.

Policy Implications

While this paper does not lead up to explicit policy suggestions or critiques, its results
have a relatively general implication. The conclusions demonstrate that the computer
software industry thrives as a mixed market. The symbiotic relationship is a crucial
component in technological growth and its contribution to the success of the software
industry needs to be taken into consideration before any policies are enacted. Whether it

10

Interestingly, Cambell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz (2010) argue that there will soon be a “convergence to the

middle” of open source and proprietary industries; implying that there will no longer be two separate industries.
They believe all firms will exploit the benefits of both open source and proprietary programming .
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entails changes in copyrights and patents or alterations to open source licenses, policies
that aim to only influence one particular group of developers will ultimately affect the
entire software industry due to the connection and beneficial relationship OSS and
proprietary firms enjoy. It is for this reason that policy implementations or modifications
need to be taken into serious consideration beforehand.

VII.

Conclusion

The atypical economic characteristics in the software industry, and open source
attributes in particular, have raised several intriguing questions over the past few years.
Open source communities’ success, operations, and even existent have been the focus of
many research papers in the economic discipline. As a result of this, a review of previous
literature was used to establish the motivations behind contribution to open source
projects and the benefits that can result from the operations of their communities. It was
found that a major motivating factor for OSS developers was the opportunity to better
signal their programming abilities to potential employers, i.e. proprietary companies.
Subsequently, these incentives allowed open source communities to experience lower
technical support and debugging costs as a result of producing higher quality code created
to demonstrate their level of coding capability. OSS groups acquired even more cost
reductions in innovation from constructive knowledge flows, code reuse and the
implications of “boundless cooperation”.
After analyzing the success of open source communities in technological growth,
proprietary firms’ reliance on copyrights and patents was questioned. However, it was then
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shown diagrammatically that proprietary firms use these rights to internalize the positive
externalities, create a consumer demand, and thus gain profit from a monopolistic power
over their products. By employing copyrights or patents, proprietary companies are
incentivized to maintain a higher level of technological growth.
Lastly, it was argued that even though open source communities can achieve a high
level of innovation at lower costs than proprietary firms, they would not be able to succeed
or maintain a high level of innovation without them. This is because OSS would not be has
beneficial if it were not for the career incentives provided by proprietary firms that
motivate programmers to contribute high quality work to open source projects in the first
place. The apparent interdependence of the two firms was confirmed after exploring the
possibility that proprietary firms could be benefiting from interactions with OSS
communities and developers. It was established that proprietary companies in fact acquire
lower innovation costs derived from the exploitation of open source projects; the extent of
such depending on varying OSS licenses. Collectively, the lower costs of innovation being
experienced in both open source communities and proprietary firms prompted analysis of
its effect in the previously discussed diagrams. Using the analytics from before, it was
shown that with a symbiotic-natured mixed market of OSS communities and proprietary
companies, the total fixed cost of firms decreases; thus allowing for a higher profits and
greater incentive for technological growth.
While the implication of further stimulating technological growth as result of a
mixed market has its merits, further research could be done. As mentioned earlier in
regards to limitations of the paper, some companies have acknowledge the symbiotic
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nature of the computer software industry and have began incorporating open source
communities and initiatives in their own firms. Some researchers suggest that there will
ultimately be a convergence of industries and that all firms will incorporate both open
source and proprietary coding into their companies. It would be valuable to investigate
whether this convergence is plausible and if it would lessen, maintain, or increase the
current level of technological growth. Nevertheless, the computer software industry is
currently operating at a high level of technological growth and will continue to do so by
utilizing the symbiotic nature of the relationship between proprietary firms and open
source software communities.
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